This week I was in San Francisco to attend the RSA Conference, where I gave and attended a couple of talks, met some old and new friends, walked around the exhibition hall, and enjoyed this amazing city. Here’s some highlights:
A few weeks ago, we received a request to publish an article on behalf of an author residing in China. After review of its content, we are sharing these insights on the CyberSmashup blog.
We hope you enjoy this post, learn something new about privacy and censorship, and if feeling compelled to respond or react, will not hesitate to post a comment, or contact us to contribute your opinion in a form of a blog post.
On December 12-13, I attended The TRUDEVICE workshop in Freiburg. There, experts in hardware security from various domains met to discuss methods to increase the hardware security of integrated circuits. Below I present some of the subjects which I found most interesting.
One of the topics concerned the detection of hardware Trojans and more generally checking the integrity of integrated circuits. A European project called HINT was launched in 2012 to find solutions to this problem and to create a common framework to verify a system’s integrity. Initial results from this project were presented at TRUDEVICE by Julien Francq from CASSIDIAN.
Although the universe of hardware Trojan possibilities is diverse, they managed to identify two main solutions for their detection: Logic scanning and side channel leakage comparisons. Functional logic scanning is not well adapted for identifying Trojans, as they are likely to be designed to not alter the functional behavior. A statistical approach was proposed targeting the rare events of a circuit which may contain the Trojan features. A circuit containing a Trojan should have a different current consumption and electromagnetic emission profile. This means that side channel analysis could help to identify tampered hardware. The main problem of this approach is that you must own at least one hardware implementation without any Trojan to have reference traces. Three other presentations were dedicated to hardware Trojan detection and insertion during this workshop. Continue reading
I enthusiastically use two-factor authentication whenever possible because static passwords aren’t the best mechanism to mitigate risk… Traditional passwords are vulnerable to social engineering, key-loggers, malwares and—especially as computers become ever faster—to cracking. With many popular websites providing two-factor authentication (TFA, T-FA or 2FA), why shouldn’t you add two-factor authentication to OpenSSH that run on the Cloud infrastructure? Public-key, Private-key authentication is generally considered to be very secure, but why not take an extra step?
This article describes how to use a One Time Password (OTP) based on the OATH open standard. We will use as an example a TOTP (Time-based One-time Password Algorithm like SecurID – RFC 6238) software token on a smartphone.
We were looking for a fast layer 3 switch, I mean really fast. It should not only be able to switch frames at 10GbE line-rate but it should also be able to route packets (from one interface to another) at line-rate. With the smallest IP packet (84Bytes) it means that we can send it about 14’880’955 time per second to fill a 10GbE pipe.
And that’s where it becomes a problem, most enterprise-class switches were able to route at line rate from a fixed source/destination (for example a “simple” file transfer) but where dying when we randomized the destination addresses and reduced the packets size to the minimum.
We heard about Arista few months ago, we knew that they were specialized into line-rate switching. We exchanged few emails about our problems to find a switch that will fulfill our requirements, they kindly proposed to lend us a switch for one month. We were deeply impressed by the power of the switch we benchmarked, the features the provided, the openness of their products. I’ll describe here the cool things I learned from them. Continue reading
The original post comes from the author’s blog at http://h4ck.go.ddamn.it/.
This year’s CCC congress, 30c3, took place at the Congress Center Hamburg from the 27th to the 30th of December. From a pragmatic perspective, it was the occasion to draw 111MWh of electrical power, for the NOC to get 20 abuse phone calls as well as 653 abuse letters and of course to play with 1.4km of yellow tubes of the Seidenstrasse vacuum-cleaner messaging system (demo).
30c3 came with its bunch of historical moments. To pick a few, Annie Machon (@AnnieMachon), ex MI5 whistleblower, came on stage to tell us about herself and her vision of the USA’s intelligence strategy of the last decade (The four wars). Also, Sarah Harrison, the British journalist who was with Snowden in Hong Kong hold a talk (incomplete) with Jacob Appelbaum (@ioerror) and Julian Assange (@wikileaks). Finally Jacob Appelbaum presented us in “To protect and infect part 2” the last Snowden revelations about the NSA TAO entity and its catalog of advanced exploits of any kind just before the international press. Continue reading
I’m happy to present a guest post by my friend Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen about cb0cat, a new tool he’s releasing, and a project sponsored by Kudelski Security. cb0cat will be useful to pentesters, cryptographers, and any user that needs an easy-to-use command-line tool to perform basic encrypted communications.
This post is a tutorial on the use of cb0cat, and is reproduced on the cb0cat website.